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Summary
The need to evacuate an ICU or operating theatre complex during a fire or other emergency is a rare event but
one potentially fraught with difficulty: Not only is there a risk that patients may come to harm but also that staff
may be injured and unable to work. Designing newly-built or refurbished ICUs and operating theatre suites is an
opportunity to incorporate mandatory fire safety features and improve the management and outcomes of such
emergencies: These include well-marked manual fire call points and oxygen shut off valves (area valve service
units); the ability to isolate individual zones; multiple clear exit routes; small bays or side rooms; preference for
ground floor ICU location and interconnecting routes with operating theatres; separate clinical and non-clinical
areas. ICUs and operating theatre suites should have a bespoke emergency evacuation plan and routemap that
is readily available. Staff should receive practical fire and evacuation training in their clinical area of work on
induction and annually as part of mandatory training, including ‘walk-through practice’ or simulation training
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and location of manual fire call points and fire extinguishers, evacuation routes and location and operation of
area valve service units. The staff member in charge of each shift should be able to select and operate fire
extinguishers and lead an evacuation. Following an emergency evacuation, a network-wide response should be
activated, including retrieval and transport of patients to other ICUs if needed. A full investigation should take
place and ongoing support and follow-up of staff provided.
.................................................................................................................................................................
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What other guidelines are available on
this topic?
Previous guidance for dealing with a fire on an ICU has been
published by the Intensive Care Society (ICS) within its
Guidelines for the Provision of Intensive Care Services in
2019 [1]. Guidance for dealing with a fire in the operating
theatre [2] and evacuation of an operating theatre [3] is
included in the Quick Reference Handbook, published by
the Association of Anaesthetists (https://anaesthetists.org/
Home/Resources-publications/Safety-alerts/Anaesthesia-
emergencies/Quick-Reference-Handbook).
Whywere these guidelines developed?
At least three fires have occurred in UK ICUs over the last
10 y, all of which required full-scale emergency evacuation
of patients, staff and relatives [4, 5]. Many changes were put
in place following the fire in Bath [4] in 2011. While writing
the Guidelines for the Provision of Intensive Care Services,
a number of outstanding issues became apparent which
needed addressing by a multidisciplinary Working Party
made up of clinicians, healthcare fire officers and
representatives from industry, the Fire and Rescue Services,
NHS Improvement and the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE). The Association of Anaesthetists and ICS therefore
set up an expert Working Party as a joint venture, and these
guidelines have been produced as a result of the work of
this group. During the COVID-19 pandemic, issues around
fire safety, emergency evacuations and the safe use of
oxygen have become especially relevant, and these are
discussed in more detail in online Supporting Information
Appendix S1.
Howandwhydoes this statement differ
fromexistingguidelines?
These guidelines are the first of their kind to include input
from such a broad group of experts. They contain
educational materials and resources which we hope will be
used by hospitals to improve fire safety and evacuation
procedures. Existing government guidance states the
following: first, ICU design should be based on the
prevention of a fire occurring within the hospital spreading
into the ICU; and second, the ICU should be divided into
clinical and non-clinical fire-rated zones to prevent a fire in a
non-clinical area impacting on clinical areas [6]. Little
consideration to date has been given to a fire starting within
an ICU clinical area.
These guidelines include new recommendations for
frontline clinical staff in ICUs and operating theatre suites to
be trained to select and safely use fire extinguishers, and to
receive their annual mandatory fire training in their place of
work, ideally as a multidisciplinary team. While the latter is
recommended every 2 years in existing Department of
Health guidelines [7], it is something that is rarely done in
practice.
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Throughout these guidelines, ‘ICU’ refers to ICU, high
dependency units, ICU escalation areas, respiratory high
care areas and other areas of the hospital where non-
invasive respiratory support is provided. ‘Theatre operating
suite’ refers to operating theatres and theatre recovery
wards/post-anaesthesia care units.
Although this guidance is specific to ICUs and
operating theatre suites, the general principles may be
applicable to any ward using non-invasive respiratory
support and in particular high-flownasal oxygen.
Recommendations
Preparation, planning and training
1 Clinical staff of all grades should receive
multidisciplinary training in their place of work as part
of annual mandatory training, covering the
management of a fire and evacuation of their work
area. This should include the location and operation of
manual fire call points, oxygen shut off valves (area
valve service units), evacuation aids, evacuation routes
and procedures as well as the importance of keeping
evacuation routes clear. Practical ‘walk-through’
training and/or simulated evacuations should be
practised every 2 y.
2 Nominated clinical staff should be trained to select and
safely use fire extinguishers.
3 ICUs and operating theatre suites should be designed
to incorporate the latest fire safety features and have
individualised evacuation policies and evacuation
route plans. Intensive care units and operating theatre
suites should be divided into zones, each with its own
oxygen shut off valve (area valve service unit), so that
oxygen supply to an area affected by a fire can be
stopped without affecting oxygen delivery to other
areas.
4 Ventilation of ICUs and clinical areas where high-flow
nasal oxygen, facemask continuous positive airway
pressure and non-invasive ventilation are in use should
be > 10 air changes per hour to prevent oxygen
enrichment of the ambient atmosphere.
5 ICU and operating theatre fire alarms should be
audible throughout the department unless a specific
decision is made by clinicians to turn the sound feature
off in that area. A computerised fire alarm handler
system should be installed in hospital switchboards to
make it quicker and easier to liaise with the Fire and
Rescue Services.
6 Laminated action cards, specific for that clinical area,
should be placed next to all manual fire call points so
that they can be followed in the event of an emergency
evacuation.
7 Each ICUbed space and operating theatre should have
appropriate and sufficient evacuation equipment
stored in an easily accessible location, including
evacuation aids, evacuation boxes and a torch.
Intensive care units and theatres should have sufficient
numbers of appropriately trained staff working on each
shift to enable an emergency evacuation to occur at
any time.
8 Oxygen cylinders should be stored, handled and used
according to the gas supplier’s instructions, using the
correct sequence of actions when administering
oxygen and using an oxygen cylinder bed bracket at all
times.
9 Major incident planning should include plans for
internal incidents, where the staff themselves are
victims and unable to work and where ICU and
operating theatre suites become unusable for
patient care. Critical care networks should have plans
in place to enable emergency retrieval, transfer and
ongoing care of critically ill patients from one
hospital to another in the event of a fire or similar
emergency.
During afire or life-threatening emergency
10 Staff safety must be the priority. If staff find themselves
dealing with a fire or other potentially life-threatening
emergency situation, they should make an emergency
‘dynamic risk assessment’ weighing up their
responsibilities to their patients against the risk to their
own life and using the best information they have
available at the time.
Following an emergency evacuation
11 All staff involved in a fire or similar emergency should
be supported following the event, attend a short
operational debrief, be assessed by their
occupational health department before re-starting
work and have access to confidential counselling
services. The use of peer-support tools, such as
trauma risk management, has been shown to be
beneficial.
12 A full investigation of any critical incident should
be carried out looking at all relevant contributory
factors, ideally by an independent team and using a
human factors and ergonomics investigative tool,
and lessons identified embedded into future
planning.
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Introduction
Over the past 15 years there have been at least three
fires in UK ICUs; each fire required a full-scale emergency
evacuation of patients, staff and relatives [1, 4, 5]. Fires
have occurred in operating theatres during the use of
lasers [8], including in combination with high-flow nasal
oxygen (HFNO) [9] and with dental implants [10], and
have also been caused by diathermy interacting with
chlorhexidine [11]. Evacuation of other UK ICUs has
occurred following flood, power cut and air conditioning
malfunction with noxious gases being unintentionally
pumped into an ICU (T. Clutton-Brock, personal
communication).
ICUfire, Bath, 2011
An ICU fire at the Royal United Hospital, Bath, was caused
by an oxygen cylinder in 2011 [1, 4, 12]. The oxygen
cylinder was laid on a patient’s bed ready for transfer,
caught fire as it was turned on and appeared to explode.
Flames were seen rising up from the bed and the
mattress and bedding burnt violently, resulting in the ICU
being filled within seconds with noxious, thick, black and
irritant smoke: This reduced visibility to 1 metre and
made breathing extremely difficult for staff, patients and
their visitors. The fire rapidly spread to the patient’s legs,
bedding and mattress, then the curtains surrounding the
bed space and finally the flooring beneath the bed. The
patient on the burning bed was pulled to safety, 10 other
patients were evacuated within 7 min, and a 12th patient
(ventilated in a side room and not immediately affected)
15 min later. The fire was put out by two doctors using
five fire extinguishers. The patient on the bed suffered
burns to her lower legs but no other patient was harmed;
two members of staff suffered smoke inhalational injury
requiring hospital admission [1, 4]. Twenty-five consultant
anaesthetists arrived within 30 minutes to help deal with
the aftermath of the fire, transfer five patients to
neighbouring ICUs and set up a temporary overnight high
dependency unit in the post-anaesthesia care unit (PACU)
for the remaining seven patients. The oxygen cylinder was
almost completely destroyed in the fire, hampering
subsequent investigations, but it is believed that the fire
started within the oxygen cylinder valve [1, 4, 13].
ICUfire, RoyalMarsdenHospital, London2008
In 2008, a fire started in the roof of the Royal Marsden
Hospital, London, which spread very rapidly and resulted in
the destruction of the ICU [1, 5]. A complete and successful
evacuation of the building occurred within 28 min [1, 5]. At
the time, there were six patients in the 16-bed ICU and three
patients in the operating theatres. All ventilated patients
were transferred to the ICU of the neighbouring Royal
Brompton Hospital. No patients or staff were injured. The
unlikely need for complete evacuation of the building had
not been included in the hospital’s major incident plan, but
the timing (2 January at 1pm) was fortunate in that both
hospitals had relatively low occupancy as their work-load is
mainly elective [1, 5].
ICUfire, Royal StokeHospital, 2017
A fire at the Royal StokeUniversity Hospital in 2017 occurred
when a fire was started deliberately in a shared corridor
between theatres and the ICU [1]. Although the fire was
dealt with promptly, smoke permeated into the ICU
resulting in poor visibility and an acrid odour. Twenty-four
ICU patients were evacuated immediately and transferred
to PACU and operating theatre suites elsewhere in the
hospital building. No patients or staff came to harm.
A key difference between a fire or other emergency that
necessitates the evacuation of an ICU or operating theatre
suite, and a similar situation occurring in a standard hospital
ward, is that ICU patients and those within an operating
theatre suite are likely to be critically unwell, with a
significant oxygen requirement and dependent on
respiratory and/or other system support. These patients are
therefore entirely dependent on staff to evacuate them. As a
result, emergency evacuation of these areas requires
different guidance and a more focused approach
compared with the rest of the hospital. On a standard
hospital ward, staff are advised to evacuate all patients, shut
the fire doors and wait for the hospital internal fire response
team and the Fire and Rescue Services to arrive to deal with
the firs. However, ICU and theatre staff may be faced with
difficult decisions as to whether they can safely evacuate
their patients without compromising their own safety. The
same may be true for staff in emergency departments,
coronary care units and other monitored beds elsewhere in
the hospital. In addition to the need for different evacuation
guidance, staff themselves may be injured and unfit to work
following such an emergency, meaning that incident
response plans to guide management of the aftermath of
such an event need to be adjusted to take this into
consideration.
Design of operating theatre suites and
ICUs
The best strategy to improve fire safety and ensure
emergency evacuations run without complication is to
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use the design of new and refurbished ICUs and
operating theatre suites as an opportunity to incorporate
recommended fire safety features: These are well
described in existing national guidance and include
designing ICUs and operating theatre suites with multiple
exit points, and ICUs with small fire-rated bays (ideally for
no more than six patients) or side rooms, ground floor
location, interconnecting routes with operating theatre
suites to facilitate an evacuation, smoke control systems
and misting fire suppression systems. If a ground floor
location is not practical, evacuation lifts with a dual
electrical supply should be provided. Low-level ICU
emergency lighting may be very beneficial but there
are currently no recognised standards for this in the UK
[6]. Design of a new or refurbished ICU/operating
theatre suite must be according to national guidance
[1, 6], include factors listed in Table 1 and must comply
with current Department of Health regulations
concerning fire retardant bedding, mattresses, curtains
around bed spaces and flooring [1, 6]. Fire safety of
existing ICUs and operating theatre suites is individual
and unique to each area; any fire safety issues in these
areas should be identified in that area’s annual fire risk
assessment [6].
Intensive care units and ICU escalation areas should
have ventilation systems that ensure > 10 air changes occur
per hour to prevent oxygen enrichment of ambient air [14].
This level of ventilation is also that recommended for good
infection prevention and control and is especially important
when high levels of HFNO, facemask continuous positive
airway pressure (CPAP) and non-invasive ventilation are in
use [15].
At the time of writing, any healthcare areas that were
affected by the outcomes of the national cladding review
following the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017 have been
addressed or are in the final stages of remediation.
However, uncontrolled external spread of fire by
combustible cladding systems may still need consideration
when looking at the overall delivery system of care within a
hospital but would not fall within the immediate remit of this
document.
Fire safety equipment
Fire and smokedetection and alarm systems
When a fire alarm system is activated, a signal is sent to an
alarm receiving centre, usually located within the hospital
switchboard, which alerts switchboard staff to call the Fire
and Rescue Services and bleeps internal fire response
Table 1 Factors to be prioritisedwhen designing or refurbishing a new ICUor operating theatre suite.
Well-marked firemanual call points, fire extinguishers and oxygen shut-off valves (AVSUs) [16, 18]
Locationof AVSUs that allows individual areas or zones of the ICUor operating theatre suite affectedby a fire to be isolatedwithout
necessarily shutting off the oxygen supply to thewhole ICU/theatre suite [18]
Multiple exit routes: ideally eachdepartment should have three separate exits [6, 16], with twoof the three exits allowing for horizontal
evacuation [6, 16]
Adopting smaller fire-ratedbays (ideally six beds or less) or side rooms, rather than large open areas, to assist with smoke control and
help prevent spread of fire [1, 2, 6, 7]
Sufficient ventilation to ensure that ICUs have > 10 air changes per hour to prevent oxygen enrichment of the ambient atmosphere
whenHFNO, facemaskCPAP andnon-invasive ventilation are used [15, 33].Operating theatres typically have 25 air changes per
hour, anaesthetic rooms15 andoperating theatre recovery areas 10 [14]
Consideration of ground floor location for ICUs, and easy interconnecting routes between ICUandoperating theatres tomake
evacuation easier [1, 6]. If a ground floor location is not practical or realistic, then vertical evacuation lifts with a dual electrical supply
should be installed
Separating clinical and non-clinical areas [1, 2, 6]
Doorwidths onbays and side rooms should bebig enough to allowbariatric beds to pass throughwithout adjustment [1, 2, 7]
Automatic smoke control systems in ICUand consideration for low-level emergency lighting to assist with emergency evacuations
Consideration ofmodern sprinkler andmisting systems [6, 20, 29]
Operating theatres should be arranged in zones so that > 50%of operating theatres remain unaffectedby a fire should one occur, for
example, an operating theatre complex of 8 theatres in a row canbe divided into twoblocks of four theatres, separatedby a 30-min
fire-rated sub-compartment
Operating theatres should have an override and control of smoke control and ventilation system
A ceiling void, with removable ceiling tiles and electrical cabling located here, should only be included in the designof an
ICU/operating theatre suite if no other alternatives are possible [18]
ICUpendants improve the electrical safety [43], are likely to reduce fire risk [43] and are recommended
AVSU, area valve service units; HFNO, high-flownasal oxygen; CPAP, continuous positive airwaypressure.
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teams. A continuous fire alarm indicates a fire in that
particular zone: In an ICU or operating theatre suite, this
should prompt immediate investigation as to whether there
is an actual fire, tackle the fire with fire extinguishers if staff
are trained and feel safe to do so and start an evacuation [6].
An intermittent alarm indicates a fire in an adjacent zone
and should prompt staff to prepare for an evacuation [6]. A
fire alarm system that meets UK standards and is
appropriate for each individual ICU or operating theatre
suite is mandatory [6]. If a department is large and/or has a
complex layout, more than one fire alarm repeater panel
may be required to help quickly determine the location of a
fire [6].
Staff respond better to a combined audible and visual
fire alarm compared with an alarm with only a visual alert
[16]. TheWorking Party recommends that the audible alarm
feature is not inactivated in ICUs as has been standard
practice in the past [17]. Discussions with clinicians in
operating theatres should guide any decisions to inactivate
audible alarms where this may be dangerously distracting
for staff.
Computerisedfire alarmhandler systems
Installing a computerised fire handler system in hospital
switchboards, or other alarm receiving centres, makes it
quicker and easier for hospital switchboard operators to
contact Fire and Rescue Services and potentially reduce
their response times for a confirmed fire [6].
Fire extinguishers
Firefighting equipment can reduce the risk of a small fire
developing into a larger one [7]. The safe use of an
appropriate fire extinguisher to control a fire in its early
stages may reduce the risk to others by allowing staff more
time for evacuation of patients and aid staff past a fire [7].
We recommend that nominated staff in ICUs and
operating theatre suites should be trained to select and
safely use the appropriate type of fire extinguisher,
depending on the likely cause of the fire, with such
training organised by the hospital Fire Safety Officer.
Practical fire extinguisher training is recommended where
possible. Some fire experts recommend the use of
‘universal’ type fire extinguishers (P50s or misting type) as
these can reduce the issues around fire extinguisher
selection and fire source identification: however, this is
controversial, and we recommend that local hospital Fire
Safety Officers make decisions about such equipment.
Each shift should ideally have one member of staff who
has been trained to select and safely use a fire
extinguisher and who is ideally not the member of staff in
charge: This would allow the member of staff in charge to
lead an evacuation and direct operations.
Oxygen shut off valves (area valve service units)
Each area of an ICU or operating theatre suite should have
oxygen shut off valves, also known as area valve service units
(AVSU), which allow the pipeline oxygen supply to each area
to be isolated. Operating an AVSU in the event of a fire will
stop the flow of oxygen to the area affected by fire, thereby
reducing its impact and spread and extending the time
available to safely evacuate patients [18]. Of note, operating
the AVSU will stop the flow of oxygen to all patients in that
area, many of whom may be dependent on oxygen for
survival. This is a clinical decision which can only be taken by
the most senior clinical member of staff present. If
necessary, oxygen cylinders can be used to administer
oxygen to patients as an alternative to pipeline oxygen in
this situation. Ideally, an ICU or operating theatre suite
would be divided into different areas, each with their own
AVSU, enabling oxygen to be shut off to one area without
disrupting oxygen supply to another. If oxygen is not a
direct contributory factor to the fire, that is, if a ventilator or
oxygen cylinder has not ignited, this should be the last
action before the ICU or operating theatre suite is
evacuated of patients.
Area valve service unit locations should be included in
fire safety and evacuation drawings [18]. Oxygen training for
all healthcare professionals within the ICU or operating
theatre suite should include information as to where AVSUs
are located, how to operate them and the implications for
patients of operating AVSUs as above [1, 5, 6, 12, 18]. Dual
oxygen circuits are recommended in ICUs to improve
oxygen supply resilience [18], meaning that two AVSUs may
need to be turned off to isolate one zone [18].
Automatic smoke control systems
Provision of automatic smoke control systems should be
considered during the design and refurbishment of ICUs [6,
https://www.smokecontrol.org.uk]. These increase the time
available for an emergency evacuation to take place by
reducing the temperature and concentration of smoke and
by improving visibility [6].
Automaticfire suppression systems
Partial sprinkler/water mist protection systems can help
mitigate localised fire risks in non-clinical areas [6,
https://www.bafsa.org.uk]. In the past, they have not been
recommended in ICU and operating theatre clinical areas
for the following reasons: water ingress into electrical
sockets and medical devices resulting in total power
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failure; generation of large quantities of steam; risk of
water pooling and subsequent electrocution; potential
temperature shock to patients; cooling of toxic smoke;
risk that the weight of water can exceed the loading for
the building leading to structural collapse and/or
flooding of wards below [19]. However, many fire safety
experts now believe that modern sprinklers or water mist
systems are extremely reliable in limiting fire growth and
extinguishing fires [20]. We recommend that such
systems are considered in conjunction with the overall
package of fire safety precautions for the hospital’s fire
safety strategy (https://www.bafsa.org.uk).
Automatic emergency low-level lighting
Smoke can significantly reduce visibility in the event of a
fire within an ICU or operating theatre suite and hamper
an emergency evacuation [4, 12]. Many fire experts
recommend that low-level emergency lighting should be
installed when ICUs and operating theatre suites are built
and refurbished to improve visibility even when ceiling
lighting is ineffective [7, 21–23]. Fire alarm systems which
automatically trigger emergency low-level lighting, smoke
control systems and fire suppression systems for clinical
areas would reduce the cognitive load of clinical staff
involved in an emergency evacuation.
Emergency evacuation policies
Each ICU and operating theatre suite must have a bespoke
evacuation policy in place, specific for a fire but also
applicable for other types of emergency evacuation
(Table 2) [1, 3, 6, 12, 16]. These policies must be reviewed
and updated regularly.
Strategies to improve safe emergency
evacuation of patients
Accessible evacuation policies and action cards
Local evacuation policies should be readily available
digitally as well as printed and laminated in a folder in a
central area of the ICU or operating theatre suite. In
addition, an emergency evacuation route map should be
Table 2 Factors which should be included in ICU and operating theatre suite emergency evacuation policies.
Environment Other locationswithin the hospital where ICU care canbeprovided and anaesthetisedpatients looked after
temporarily, ideally which canbe reachedby evacuatingpatients in a horizontalmanner. Possibilities would
includeother ICUs, operating theatre suites and the emergencydepartment [6]
Evacuation routes, both primary (main exit route) and secondary (alternative route should the primary route be
obstructedor not safe to use) [6, 16]
Designof ICUs andoperating theatre suiteswhich allowpatients to be compartmentalised [6]
Possible co-existingpower or equipment failure [6]
Layout of the building and the need to negotiate stairs during an evacuation [6, 16]
In amajor fire, serial evacuationmay be requiredwith a stagedmove to the outside and eventual evacuation of the
whole hospital [1, 5, 12]
Patients Triage of patients in the followingorder:
1 Evacuate patients nearest a fire first
2 Then evacuate the least unwell patients
3 Then evacuate themost unwell patients
4 Evacuate patientswithin side rooms last
Ensure that bariatric beds fit through the relevant doorways in evacuation routes, and that plans are in place for
evacuationof bariatric patients in upstairs wardswith the possibility of lifts being inaccessible [12, 16]
Consider nursingpatients receiving ECMOor other therapies involvingbulky and relatively immobile equipment
furthest from the exit, to prevent bulky equipment hampering the evacuationof other patients
Clinical Provisionof ventilatory support (transport ventilators or hand ventilation if necessary) with accompanying oxygen
cylinders [1]
Requirement for drug infusionpumps (with fully chargedbattery power) and a supply of emergencymedications
[1]
Likely need for continuation of invasivemonitoring [1]
Temporary discontinuation of renal replacement therapy or ECMO [1]
Communications Transfer of patient notes if paper notes are used
Staff Consider the fact that staffmay themselves be harmedby a fire and therefore unfit to continueworking [1, 5, 12]
ECMO, extracorporealmembraneoxygenation.
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displayed on the wall [1, 12, 16]. Laminated evacuation
action cards, summarising steps for staff to take in an
emergency, specific for that clinical area and with clearly
defined roles for each staff member, should be attached to
the wall next to emergency fire manual call points (Fig. 1) [1,
12]. In the event of a fire or other situation requiring
emergency evacuation, these action cards can be removed
from the wall by staff and the steps followed. An example of
such an evacuation action card for an ICU is shown in
Figure 1 and includes the following points:
• Step 1: Activate manual fire call point. If this fails, call
2222 or the local emergency switchboard number.
• Step 2: Stop HFNO or facemask/nasal cannulae oxygen
delivery to any patient affected by the fire and move
patient(s) in immediate danger to a place of safety.
• Step 3: Attempt to tackle fire using a fire extinguisher – if
safe to do so and you are trained to do this.
• Step 4: Operate oxygen shut off valves to zone affected
by fire (decision to be made by the most senior doctor
and/or nurse present) and provide oxygen to other
patients in that zone using an oxygen cylinder.
• Step 5: Prepare patients for immediate evacuation,
allocate roles, contact a nominated co-ordinator and
plan evacuation routes and assembly points.
○ Patients receiving HFNO or other non-invasive
respiratory support may be difficult to evacuate
safely: options include transferring to a non-
rebreathing oxygen mask with reservoir plus oxygen
cannulae, continuing current oxygen therapy (both
options would require taking two oxygen cylinders)
or using aMaplesonC (Waters) circuit.
• Step 6: Establish patients in safe areas and follow major
incident policy.
○ Assess patients for burns, smoke inhalation and
carbonmonoxide poisoning.
○ Direct staff to the emergency department for
assessment.
• Step 7: Staff involved should stop work once all patients
are safe.
○ One staffmember to lead a team immediate debrief
○ Write list of all staff involved to help support them
following this event, with more senior doctor and
nurse present to keep this list in a safe place.
○ Ensure staff involved are safe to return home before
they do so.
The evacuation of an operating theatre complex should
be done using the steps detailed in the Quick Reference
Handbook emergency evacuation section (online Supporting
InformationAppendix S2)which follows theseprinciples.
Intensive care units and operating theatre suites should
be appropriately staffed at all times to allow an emergency
evacuation to take place should that be necessary. In
operating departments that do not provide a 24-h service,
fire doors should be shut as a matter of routine before
closing the department.
Intensive care units should be arranged in a way that
avoids bulky and relatively immobile equipment blocking
Figure 1 Example of an ICU fire and emergency evacuation action card (RUHBath).
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emergency exits. For example, some ICUs are arranged so
that patients receiving extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation (ECMO) are cared for furthest from the
emergency exits: this prevents the movement of other
patients to the emergency exit being obstructed by ECMO
equipment, should an emergency evacuation be required
(MRalph, personal communication).
Evacuation boxes
Each ICU bed space and operating theatre should have
equipment to enable an emergency evacuation, including
evacuation aids and evacuation boxes, in an easily accessible
location. If individual hospitals feel that the resource
implications of having one emergency evacuation box per
ICU bed space and one box per theatre are too great, then
they may consider having one emergency evacuation box
shared between ICU bed spaces or operating theatres in
close proximity. The contents of these boxes will depend on
individual ICUs and operating theatre suites, taking into
account the level of the building that they are on [3]. An
evacuationbox should contain the following [3]:
• Propofol or other sedative agent






• Paper anaesthetic charts or ICU charts to enable
observations and note recording during an evacuation.
Oxygen cylinders should be kept in a central designated
store and fetched in the event of an emergency evacuation
[6]. If a paper record system is in use, the patient’s notes and
drug chart should be evacuated with the patient if possible
and safe to do so. If the hospital has electronic patient
records and/or an electronic prescribing system, then a
system should be put in place to enable staff to rapidly print
paper drug charts, possibly in a remote location, and allow
for continuity inmedication administration.
Evacuation aids
Evacuation of patients on their beds in a horizontal fashion is
likely to be the safest and quickest option. The local
evacuation policy should be followed: for ICUs and
operating theatre suites that are not on the ground floor,
recommended evacuation routes may include a
combination of horizontal evacuation to a nearby zone,
followed by vertical evacuation using evacuation lifts in that
zone. It is possible that staff may need to use specialised
evacuation aids [24] for evacuations from non-ground floor
locations: These should be suitable for bariatric patients,
and include the following different types:
• Evacuation sheets which can be fitted on to hospital
beds and allow patients to be slid safely along corridors
and/or down stairs.
• Evacuation chairs (‘stairchairs’) which can be used for the
evacuation of mobility-impaired patients. These look
like a deckchair with skis and wheels underneath: They
glide downstairs on the skis and use the wheels to move
along flat surfaces, but are only suitable for conscious
patients who can hold themselves in a sitting position
and understand instructions. They can also be difficult
and slow to use.
• Evacuation mats: these look like thin mattresses and can
be used for patients who are bed-bound.
All equipment should be regularly maintained and
tested, should only be used by staff trained in their use and
may not be suitable for some patient groups (e.g. post
spinal surgery). In the case of a fire, any aids reliant onmains
electricitymust not be used.
Smokehoods
Smoke hoods are used by prison officers attending a fire to
give them temporary but immediate respiratory protection
from the effects of smoke and fumes during an evacuation
[25]. Some fire experts believe that such equipment could
be considered in ICUs and operating theatres to protect
staff from smoke inhalation and extend the time available to
safely evacuate patients. Smoke hoods are classed as
personal protective equipment and their introduction
would therefore require training of selected clinical staff in
their application, operation and limitations, plus regular
inspection andmaintenance and regular physical training.
Specificmeasures for use in operating theatreswhen
using lasers or other potentialfire hazards
Fires within operating theatres represent a serious safety
risk for patients undergoing surgery [26]. The incidence of
surgical fires can be significantly reduced by prevention,
education, training, planning, good communication within
the operating theatre and positively separating the three
elements of the fire triangle (oxygen, ignition source and
fuel. The risk of a fire in an operating theatre can be reduced
by the following strategies [27]:
• Safe use of diathermy, lasers and fibreoptic light
sources: regular inspection for evidence of insulation
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failure before use (devices, wires and connections),
keeping tips of cautery instruments clean and free of
char and tissue, and placing devices in a holster or safety
cover when not in use rather than placing directly on the
patient or surgical drapes.
• Allowing alcohol-based cleaning solutions (e.g.
chlorhexidine) time to dry before using diathermy,
avoiding pooling of such solutions and removing alcohol-
soakedmaterials, drapes andgownsbeforediathermy.
• Using closed oxygen delivery systems wherever
possible: if an open delivery system is used, additional
precautions should be made to exclude oxygen from
the operative field.
If a fire occurs, staff should use a bespoke operating
theatre emergency evacuation action card and follow the
guidance within the Association of Anaesthetists’ Quick
Reference Handbook [2], which includes the following
actions:
• Step 1: Stop the laser or diathermy.
• Step 2: Call for help.
• Step 3: Activate the fire alarm and fetch a carbon dioxide
fire extinguisher.
• Step 4: Airway fire – stop ventilation of the patient and
stop fresh gas flow, reduce the FiO2 to 0.21, flood airway
with sterile water or saline, remove tracheal tube if on
fire, follow QRH actions for further management (online
Supporting Information Appendices S2 and S3)
including re-intubation, transfer to ICU and
consideration of bronchoscopy.
• Step 5: Non-airway fire – remove all drapes and burning
material, flood fire with saline or saline-soaked gauze,
use a carbon dioxide fire extinguisher and consider risk
of patient inhalational injury with potential need for
intubation and ventilation and transfer to ICU.
• Step 6: If fire continues, consider operating the oxygen
shut off valve (AVSU) for that operating
theatre/operating theatre suite area.
• Step 7: Liaise with anaesthetic co-ordinator and
operating theatre co-ordinator, who should do the
following and aim to evacuatewithin 30 min:
○ delegate one staff member to update all theatre
teams and ask them to stop anaesthetising where
possible. Consider whether to stop operating/how to
safely suspend operation and prepare for evacuation,
await instructions regarding timing/evacuation site.
○ stop theatre reception sending for new patients,
send patients from the operating theatre recovery
ward back to thewards if possible.
○ liaise with ICU and actions as described in the QRH
(onlineSupporting InformationAppendicesS2andS3).
Minimising the risk of an airway fire when using lasers
and diathermy requires meticulous preparation and this
includes the use of the lowest tolerated FiO2, matt black
laser instruments, the lowest laser energy possible and
avoiding the use of monopolar diathermy. Of note, no
laser-tracheal tube presently manufactured is laser proof;
instead, they are laser resistant and must not be presumed
to be a perfect barrier. Wrapping tubes in metal foil to
reduce the risk of a fire is a historical practice and is actively
discouraged. A carbon dioxide fire extinguisher should be
available in theatre when lasers are being used, and staff
should have received training in its use [27].
Of note, HFNO is not recommended by some
manufacturers when lasers or diathermy are in use [28],
although some expert centres have reported it as being
possible [29–31]. These studies are small and the use of
HFNO with lasers or diathermy should not be considered
without further evidence, utmost caution and following
close liaison with local laser protection supervisors, laser
protection advisors and clinical laser experts as appropriate.
Some hospitals have adapted their Surgical Safety
Checklist or team briefing document to include an ‘airway
fire’ risk assessment tool, where an additional fire risk is
predicted if two or more of the following are present:
surgical site is above the xiphoid, an open oxygen source is
in use and diathermy is planned [27]. This encourages
planning, risk reduction strategies and procedures to follow
if an airway fire should occur.
Fire training
Fire evacuation training
All staff working in ICU and operating theatres should
receive annual mandatory fire training in their place of work
and ideally as a multidisciplinary team, covering the
following: location of fire manual call points; location and
safe use of fire extinguishers; evacuation routes and the
importance of keeping such routes clear at all times;
assembly points; evacuation aids; oxygen shut off valves
(AVSUs) [1, 5–7, 12, 16]. This training should be specific to
their workplace and take place on induction and annually as
part of mandatory training [16]. Practical ‘walk-through’
training and simulated evacuations should be practised as a
multidisciplinary team every 2 y, with staff using emergency
evacuation cards (e.g. Fig. 1) to guide their actions and
liaising with their hospital switchboard or other alarm
receiving centre [1]. Training should allow improvements to
be made to the emergency evacuation cards if needed.
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Evacuation at night should also be practised [1, 16]. Training
should cover the potential need for staff to make an
emergency assessment of whether it is safe to evacuate
patients or whether they need to place their own safety first.
Fire prevention training
Strategies to prevent fire should be covered during staff
training [16] and include the following: caution when
charging mobile phones and digital devices; caution when
using extension leads; avoiding charging multiple electrical
devices on one electrical socket; ensuring that alcohol hand
gel has dried before using oxygen cylinders; avoiding
petroleum-based products (e.g. lip moisturisers) in patients
receiving oxygen therapy; ensuring clean hands when using
oxygen cylinders [32]. The importance of fire doors and fire
warden-led checks within departments should be
emphasised [16]. Systems should be in place for staff to
raise concerns regarding equipment or practices whichmay
constitute a fire hazard and the need for immediate
replacement and/ormaintenance.
Fire extinguisher training
Fire extinguisher training should be provided for clinical
staff as described above.
Oxygen safety
Safe use of pipeline oxygen
As oxygen can accelerate the rate of a fire, it is important for
staff in charge to know where the oxygen shut off valves
(AVSUs) are located in their ICU or operating theatre suite,
when to use them, how to operate them,who should operate
themand the implications for patients of doing so [18].
Safe use of oxygen cylinders
All staff in ICUs and operating theatre suites should be given
basic training regarding the safe use of oxygen cylinders [1,
5, 12, 18, 32]. The training should include the correct
procedures to be followed when setting up the cylinder: this
includes ensuring hands are clean and dry, setting up the
cylinder away from the patient, opening the valve slowly to
limit the effects of adiabatic compressionwithin the valve and
avoiding the use of oil-based creams when administering
oxygen topatients. It is important to follow the instructions for
useprovidedby the gas supplier (Table 3) [4, 12, 32]:
• Step 1: Set up cylinder in an upright position and
pointing the cylinder away from the patient and the
operator.
• Step 2: Open the cylinder valve (on the side of the CD
oxygen cylinder) slowly.
• Step 3: Select the oxygen flow rate, using the flowmeter
on the top of theCDoxygen cylinder.
• Step 4: Once the oxygen is flowing freely, start
administering oxygen to the patient.
Always use a bed bracket (online Supporting
Information Figure S1) and avoid placing the cylinder on
the bed unless there is no alternative. If placing the cylinder
on the bed, ensure the cylinder has been set up and the gas
is flowing freely before placing it on the bed.
Integral valved cylinders (e.g. CD oxygen cylinders) are
recommended for use within ICUs and operating theatre
suites as they do not require an additional regulator to be
fitted before use, making them ideal in an emergency.
Sufficient oxygen cylinders should be stored in specific
oxygen cylinder storage racks (online Supporting
Information Figure S2) within the local cylinder storage area
so that each patient in the ICU or operating theatre suite
could be given a portable oxygen cylinder during an
evacuation.
Risk of oxygen enrichment in clinical areaswhereHFNO,
facemaskCPAP andnon-invasive ventilation are in use
Oxygen enrichment of air above 20.9% will aid a fire and
have an accelerant effect on its fire growth rate, and at levels
of 23% materials will be more combustible than in ambient
air [15, 33].
To prevent oxygen enrichment of air in ICU and other
clinical areas where HFNO and facemask CPAP are carried
out, the ventilation should be > 10 air changes per hour [14];
electrical equipment that could act as a source of ignition,
including ventilators should be carefully designed and
maintained; the use of emollients and oil/alcohol-based
products should be avoided where possible; and placing a
plastic barrier apron on patients receiving HFNO/facemask
CPAP to prevent oxygen enrichment within clothing and
bedding should be considered [33].
Nominatedfire safety and emergency
evacuation lead
Each department should have a nominated lead for fire
safety and emergency evacuations with the following roles:
Liaise with the hospital Fire Safety Officer, hospital
Emergency Response lead and major incident response
team; carry out any preventative and protective measures;
keep abreast of local and national initiatives; be a focal point
for dissemination of relevant information; signpost topical
issues; and be responsible for liaising with appropriate
bodies [16]. Such nominated leads should have appropriate
training and support to carry out this role, with time and
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resources allocated accordingly. The nominated lead may
not be physically present when a fire or emergency
evacuation is required so it is recommended that there is at
least one person per shift trained to the level required level
to lead an emergency evacuation. Non-employees, such as
contract workers, locum doctors and agency nurses, should
be provided with information regarding who the fire safety
leads are and the fire safety procedures for that area of
work.
Staff duty of care
General Medical Council (GMC) Good Medical Practice
guidance states that a doctor must take prompt action if
they think that patient safety is or may be compromised
and offer help if an emergency arises in a clinical setting,
taking account of their own safety, competence and the
availability of other options for care [34]. If staff have shown
negligence in their approach to patient safety before an
event, such that material risk developed as a result of that
negligence, then they may find themselves open to
scrutiny by the GMC. However, if a fire or other life-
threatening emergency arises, staff would need to make a
swift risk/benefit analysis, balancing their responsibilities
to their patients against the risk of personal harm and
ensuring their own safety and that of their team comes first
[34-36].
Table 3 Recommendations for the safe use of oxygen cylinders.
Oxygen cylinder brackets Oxygen cylinder brackets for beds or wheelchairs should always be used.Oxygen cylinders should not
be laid on a patient’s bed unless there are noother alternatives. If this is the case, the oxygen cylinder
should be set up and turnedon (as describedbelow) before placingon the bed [1, 12, 32]
Oxygen cylinder brackets should be stored in the sameplace as oxygen cylinders
Safe storage of oxygen
cylinders in ICU and
operating theatre suites
Local oxygen cylinders storage areas should be located in designated areas, away fromcombustible
materials [18, 32]
Smaller oxygen cylinders should be stored in a rack or onwallmountedbrackets.
Larger oxygen cylinders should be stored in awallmountedpen or in specially designed trolleys [18,32]
Local storage areas should have signs to indicate oxygen storage [32]
Full and empty oxygen cylinders should be stored separatelywith signs visible to distinguish between
the two [32]
Oxygen cylinders should be storedwith their tamper evident seal in place to show that they have not
been used [32]
Oxygen cylindersmust be storedwith the shut-off valve (on the side) turned off and the flowmeter set to
zero [1, 32].
Cylinder stock should bemaintained at a level to ensure that there are sufficient cylinders available to
deal with emergencies.
Cylinder numbers should take account of howmanypatientsmay need to be evacuated from the ICUor
operating theatre suite and the number of cylinders requiredby eachpatient [32]
Recommended sequence
for turning on an oxygen
cylinder andproviding
oxygen for a patient [1,
11, 26]
1 Set up oxygen cylinder away from the patient in an upright position, pointing the cylinder outlet away
from thepatient andoperator
2 Check that flow rate selector is set to zero
3 Slowly open cylinder shut-off valve (on the side of the cylinder) with the oxygen outlets facing away
from thepatient andoperator
4 Place oxygen cylinder in the cylinder bedbracket
5 Connect oxygen tubing to the flow outlet and select flow rate on the flow selector (on the top of the
cylinder)
6 Attach oxygen to the patient only once oxygen is continuously flowing
Recommended sequence
for turning off an oxygen
cylinder after use
1 Close the oxygen shut-off valve (on the side)
2 Once the flowof oxygen has stopped, turn the flow rate selector to zero
3 The cylinder can nowbe safely stored
Reportingoxygen
cylinder issues




If oxygen cylinders are storedwithin an areawhere a fire has occurred, it is recommended that:
1 Staff are not allowed to go into that area
2 Fire and Rescue Services should be informed of the exact location of the oxygen cylinders within the
ICU/operating theatre suite and an indication of the number of cylinders present
3 When the fire has been brought under control, request that the supplier arranges collection of the
incident cylinders. Cylinders should be labelled to indicate potential fire damage so they can be
tested to ensure they are safe for further use
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Investigation of critical incidents
Following a fire or similar critical incident, a full investigation
should be carried out at the earliest opportunity: This
should examine all contributory causes, appraise the
response of the hospital and identify lessons to be learned.
An initial investigation would usually be conducted by the
Fire and Rescue Services, the Police and the Health and
Safety Executive (if the incident meets the HSE’s Incident
Selection Criteria), followed by an internal investigation by
the hospital and involving the coroner in the event of a
death. Ideally, an external investigation would then be
carried out by a responsible body such as the Healthcare
Safety Investigation Branch. Both internal and external
investigations should be performed using a human factors
and ergonomics investigative tool, such as the Yorkshire
Framework model [37], which considers all possible
contributory factors: an investigation should not simply
scrutinise the actions of the healthcare workers involved at
the time of the event. Investigators should be mindful that
the patients, families and staff involved are likely to be
affected by such an event and should take necessary steps
to ensure that investigations are completed in a timely
fashion. Lessons learned should be embedded in future
planning for such incidents, and shared with other NHS
organisations, their fire safety officers and estates teams
plus patients and staff affected by the event.
Major incident planning and role of
critical care networks
The timing of an evacuation is crucial: if an evacuation
occurs too early then patients may be harmed by a transfer,
but if an evacuation occurs too late then patients and staff
may be harmed by fire and smoke [1, 5]. Wherever possible,
evacuation policies should include liaison with the Bronze
(Operational), Silver (Tactical) and Gold (Strategic)
commanders, in conjunction with the senior Fire and Rescue
officer on scene [1, 5]. However, in reality, most emergency
evacuations will have taken place longbefore this command
structure has been implemented, so any incident response
plans must reflect this and support clinical staff to make
immediate life-saving decisions. In this situation, the
Bronze/Silver/Gold command structure will be essential for
guiding plans for ongoing care of patients and services
affected.
Hospitals, working closely with their own ICUs and
operating theatre teams and alongside their incident
response plans, must construct plans for dealing with
internal incidents. These are situations where hospital staff
themselves become victims of a fire or other emergency,
and so are unable to care for patients [1]. The short-term
solution for such an emergency situation is having a reliable
and immediate means of summoning additional hospital
staff to assist and replace those affected [4, 12]. In addition,
the structure and clinical equipment of the ICU or operating
theatre suite is likely to be damaged, rendering the area
unavailable for patient care [12]. Major incident planning
should involve external agencies including the Ambulance
service and the local Fire and Rescue Services.
A hospital’s internal incident policy should define an
appropriate clinical area in which evacuated patients can be
safely cared for temporarily. Suitable alternative clinical
areas should be identified within Business Continuity and
Incident Response Plans before an incident occurring. Local
Fire and Rescue Services should be involved in this planning
and awareness of the organisation’s fire evacuation
processes. Patients will be cared for in these alternative
clinical settings until ICUbeds in neighbouring hospitals can
be identified and transportation arranged. Regional critical
care networks are central to this process and all networks
should put in place a system whereby ICUs can provide
emergency beds and a transfer service to retrieve patients
from hospitals affected by an ICU fire or similar emergency
[1, 5, 6, 12]. Such systems should be incorporated into
network-wide policies to support and plan for major and/or
internal incidents in any hospital within the region. We
recommend that critical care network lead consultants
establish a method of communicating with each other
rapidly in the event of such an emergency (for example, a
WhatsApp or Siilo group). A checklist for clinical directors,
regarding staff training and other factors related to major
incident planning, is available in online Supporting
Information Appendix S4.
Staffwelfare andwell-being: dealing
with the aftermath of afire or
emergency evacuation
A short operational debrief should be held immediately
after a fire and/or emergency evacuation [38]. Staff should
then be given the chance to talk through what happened
with their peers, ‘decompress’ and debrief before going
home, and be given information about ‘psychological first
aid’ and the range of normal reactions following a
potentially traumatic event.
All staff involved in a fire or similar emergency should
be screened for acute trauma-stress symptoms and
supported following the event using a recognised,
protocol-based, critical incident procedure that is
compliant with the most recent national guidance on post-
traumatic stress disorder [1, 39, 40]. One example is the
TRiM (Trauma Risk Management) system [1, 41, 42]. It is
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important to support and screen all staff involved in an
incident, however, small or peripheral their involvement
may seem, as pre-morbid and comorbid experiences can
be significant. All staff involved in a serious event should be
assessed by a member of the occupational health
department before re-starting work. Key aspects of a
meaningful staff welfare system include the following:
1 Good staff training and awareness of acute trauma-
stress reactions, ideally during normal working life and
before a critical event
2 An established critical incident response team to
support and screen all staff for trauma-stress symptoms.
3 An effective communication system to ensure that all
those involved know the facts about the incident at the
earliest opportunity
4 A system that proactively informs staff involved in a
critical event of changes and improvements that are
made to avoid a similar event occurring in the future. It
is important that this process is treated as a confidential
and standard operational procedure and is
independent to the organisational investigation. Staff
will vary as to how comfortable they are in disclosing
personal experiences and this needs to be handled
sensitively.
It should not be assumed that a member of staff who
does not engage in staff support is symptom-free, as
withdrawal, numb affect and avoidance are key trauma-
stress symptoms. Continuous exposure to stressful
situations (cumulative stress) is as important a factor in staff
welfare as any one-off incident, so it is important to place
any individual experience in context and be aware of the
problems that may emerge as a consequence of prolonged
exposure tomultiple events.
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